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 The aim of this study is to define the properties of the shadow banking system 
in China. The shadow banking system has been paid attention since the 
subprime crisis because the spread of this finance form over the all around 
world was one of the most significant causes of the subprime crisis. The shadow 
banking is nourished from the Chinese state capitalism which is designed to 
allocate loans to important industries so SME are dependent on the shadow 
banking. Since excessively increase in leverage through financial engineering 
and purpose-made state capitalism create irresistible burden on financial market, 
the shadow banking system is by far the important factors in order to build 
stable financial market. While considering these issues, it was understood that 
the shadow banking system is significant issue in order to build strong financial 
efficiency and stability. 
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Özet 
Bu çalışmanın amacı, Çin'deki gölge bankacılık sisteminin özelliklerini tanımlamaktır. 
Gölge bankacılık sistemine, subprime krizinden beri dikkat çekilmektedir. Çünkü bu finans 
formunun tüm dünyaya yayılması subprime krizinin en önemli nedenlerinden biridir. Gölge 
bankacılığı, önemli sanayilere kredi tahsis etmek üzere tasarlanan Çin devlet kapitalizminden 
beslenmektedir. Bu nedenle KOBİ’ler gölge bankacılığına bağımlıdır. Finansal mühendislik 
ve özel bir amaçla yapılan devlet kapitalizmi yoluyla kaldıracın aşırı derecede artması, 
finansal piyasaya dayanılmaz bir yük oluşturduğundan, gölge bankacılık sistemi istikrarlı bir 
finansal piyasa oluşturmak için önemli faktörlerden biri haline gelmiştir. Bu noktalar göz 
önüne alındığında gölge bankacılığı sisteminin güçlü finansal verimlilik ve istikrar sağlama 
konusunda dikkate değer olduğu anlaşılmaktadır. 
Anahtar Kelimeler: Gölge Bankacılığı,  Devlet Kapitalizmi, Resmi Olmayan Finans  
Introduction  
The shadow banking system has been paid attention since the subprime crisis because 
the spread of this finance form over the all around world was one of the most significant 
causes of the subprime crisis. Paul Mc-Culle is the first economist who has coined the shadow 
banking term(Gandhi,2015).This finance form is so akin to traditional banking system and 
composed of financial intermediaries but shadow banking exempts from supervision and 
regulatory. Though the shadow banks offer credit intermediation, they manage outside the 
usual banking system(Jackson,2013).In addition to supervision and regulatory, taking deposits 
is other the most important difference only the traditional banks are allowed to take deposits. 
As for the shadow banks’ the short term funding, repos, money market mutual fund shares 
and repos are the major short term funds for the shadow banks. All of them can substitute 
deposits and provide funds for the shadow banks. In addition to the 2008 subprime financial 
crisis, especially in China, the incentivized stimulate plan has been brought into force. Since 
these funds are quiet vulnerable to cash flow similar to the banks’collapse danger in 
insolvency and the shadow banks refer to legal black holes regarding to their actions, the 
shadow banks are able to again induce a globally financial crisis. 
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In spite of vagueness in the shadow banking system, structured investment 
vehicles(SIV),asset-backed commercial paper(ABCP),credit default swaps(CDS) and asset-
backed securities (ABS) are main finance vehicles also finance companies, securities lenders, 
money market mutual funds and trust companies constitute the shadow banking system. 
Simply, The Federal Saving Bank (FSB) has showed a definition that the shadow banking 
system contains activities and entities without the regular banking supervision (Tucker 
2014).On the other hand, there is significant interconnectedness between the shadow banking 
and the traditional banks in China as well USA. For example, the loans of microfinance 
companies are provided by the rational banks. Another example, especially in USA, the 
mortgage payment in traditional banks securitisated by financial derivatives is offered to 
shadow banks so that traditional banks can not only obtain liquidity but also the shadow 
banks can increase assets in their portfolio but these process increases leverage and 
demonstrate high system risk because the risk is not able to properly evaluate(Weinland 
2015).With respect to the global financial crisis, it is a good point that the collapse of the 
mortgage system is associated with above mention risk. In order to free up the traditional 
banks capital, the financial engineering as abovementioned securitization was employment to 
offer the subprime mortgage thus this additional capital freed up by securitization used to 
offer further loans so that the leverage excessively increased. As matter of fact, the 
delinquency of the shadow banking distorted global financial stability and ultimately caused 
financial crisis, which spread quickly across borders. 
Chinese state capitalism is made of financial repression and directed credit. Both of 
features grant privilege state-owned enterprise over private firms. However, 95 percent of 
registered firms are composed of small and medium firm which does not directly benefit from 
China’s pattern of state capitalism but state-affiliated firms are dominant on given loans as 
well China’s stock markets so that small and medium firms have substantially trusted on 
informal financial vehicles. Especially, after the new technologies of finance and too 
prolonged low interest rate, informal finance mechanism has flourished. For example, the 
spread of internet have stimulated the magnitude of internet financing instruments. Generally, 
informal finance vehicles are related to saving and investment instrument, which are either 
regulated or sanctioned by the People’s Bank of China. Indeed, most of them are not legally 
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forbidden. Furthermore, since the formal financial system is controlled and operated by the 
Chinese state capitalism, shadow banking will increasingly continue also shadow banking 
system will go on continuing to play significant role for search for yield and the need of fund 
for local government. The some of the informal finances are made of credit guarantee 
companies, pawnshop and investment companies(Tsai,2015). 
Clearly understanding of the shadow banking is mandatory for policy because 
reducing systematic risk in financial market is main required for policy makers; yet, 
comprehensive policies about the shadow banking system are not obvious. Thus, better 
measuring and monitoring the shadow system are to clearly put in effect. In the study, the 
shadow banking system have been tried to briefly examine and generate the features of the 
shadow banks. An important initial point to figuring outthis system is the Chinese state 
capitalism and its growth strategies. Even though there is sufficient literature about Chinese 
financial system, the literature about the shadow banking system is insufficient. Owing to this 
situation, it can be said that this study makes an important contribution to the literature. 
Shadow Banks In China  
In terms of state capitalism in China, capital is intentionally allocated to the most 
significant export industrial sectors and firms, whichdirectly and proprietarily benefit from 
one of the state capitalism’s properties (Johnson, 1982).Chinese growth strategies have 
backed up these strategic SOE. However, these features about financial repression have 
pressured on the allocation of capital and especially domestic small and medium firms have 
required pursuingother finance forms for their need of loans. Trusted on a severe of informal 
finance forms by private firms is not new event because Chinese strategies havebeen 
associated with financial repression since the earliest of reforms and many surveys have 
evidently proved these norms. For example, a survey conducted during the mid-1990s shows 
that almost some form of informal finance were used by  two-thirds private firms; also, the 
recent survey applied in 2012 to understand of the magnitude and the spread of  the informal 
finance forms poses that nearly 60 percent of private firms had engaged in informal finance 
mechanism (Li and  Hu, 2013).The purpose of used informal finance forms have gradually 
transitivized for some reasons and new actors have participated in the informal finance 
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forms;such as middle-class managers running after wealth management and local government 
encountering unfunded debt. Though the informal finance and shadow banks are neither 
regulated nor supervised by the People’s Bank of China, they are not unlawful. In other 
words, with respect to China’s context and concept, informal finance is associated with 
savings, financing and investment vehicles thatare not ratified but not banned(Tsai, 2002). 
Especially after the tightened monetary policy reining in the volume of credit and 
decreasing in inflation, the systematic risk of shadow banks has been topical issue because the 
capacity of access to bank lending for SMEs dramatically diminished so that the SMEs have 
been totally forced to borrow underground. All of the economy situations have motivated the 
flourish of Chinese informal financial market. 
Beijing government has decided on legitimating a financial reform package after the 
systematic of financial market resulted from the shadow banks not only dramatically raised, 
but also they will intend to increase the capacity of loan performance to small borrowers. 
Thus, in March 2012,the Beijing government have considered appropriate Wenzhou city 
(Figure 2) which is associated with informal lending and entrepreneurship. With aim of the 
financial reform package, the informal finance structure of the city will be legalized and 
allowing private lenders will be granted a right so that they are to run like investment 
companies to raise the loans to small and medium enterprises (SMEs)(Jielu and Mu,2013). 
Figure 1:Wenzhou Underground Lending Market, by Use of Loan, as of June 2011 
 
Sources: The Wenzhou Branch Office of the People’s Bank of China 
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Regarding to Chinese shadow banking, there are compounds which create a 
composition of informal lenders made out of P2P2,microfinance companies, trust companies, 
commercial banks and shadow currency(banks acceptance) ( lee 2016).That is, all of them 
refer to the shadow banking system. Initially,the P2P online lending system is originally came 
from the US. However, the P2P lending practices is quite different in China because US P2P 
lending platform is just able to provide information about finance intermediation service for 
either borrowers or lenders; namely, the US P2P lending system operates as a booster 
mechanism through posting or selecting borrowing and lending requests. Furthermore, 
Chinese P2P lending platform has been changed and improved by financial actors; indeed, 
Chinese system is rather different from both The US P2P and the lending practices of the 
traditional banks. Approach to the difference between the US and The China on the P2P 
lending platform, the Chinese P2P is online or offline platforms which determine 
borrowers(online but mostly offline) and offer funds for lenders. The funds in the P2P 
platforms is mostly wealth management products (WMPs),similar to asset-backed securities, 
which is pursued by investor chasing higher investment returns(Gua and Xıa,2011). The 
WMPs of the returns have higher return than loan interest. However, these fiancé activities 
have been by no means consented by the Chinese government; even this practices caused a 
credit crisis in Wenzhou not hearing of underground banking activates due to the WMPs 
default in 2011( Ren,2015). 
Figure 2: Size of China’s Shadow Banking Relative to Outstanding Bank Loans (in 
Trillions Yuan) by the End of 2011 
 
                                                          
2The Peer-to-Peer Finance Association (P2P) is the industry association, which represents online debt-based 
alternative finance companies. 
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Sources: People’s Bank of China and CEIC.  
Investors can also make an application to trust companies in order to invest in the 
WMPs because trust companies is also attractive due to higher return compared to savings 
deposits in banks.Trust companies are not required to set a reserve requirement in order to 
shield savers against loan defaults on contrary to the traditional banks. On the one hand, 
WMPs invested through trust companies are very vulnerable to economic conditions because 
WMPs returns are related capital-intensive ventures (Tsai, 2015). 
Figure 3: Distribution of Shadow Banking Assets  
 
Source: Wang, B.L., & Li, J.J. (2013).   
Commercial bank financial productsare considered as relatively durable and less risky 
though banks take more risks than have been distinguished by customers.Although 
commercial banks products have lower default, analysts have been concern over the potential 
of these products because of some case of these product defaults. Commercial banks are well 
supervised and regulated but commercial banks are substantially engaged in shadow banking 
system through offering funds to trust and investment companies. Meanwhile, commercial 
banks convert their deposits into wealth management products to lend the converted funds to 
investors. The Chinese government have legislated a law in order to prevent the systematic 
risk resulting from commercial banks and the China Banking Regulatory Commission have 
intend to regulate the practice of commercial banks in the shadow banking system but 
enforcement in real terms lags the international standard(Brehm, 2008). 
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A banks acceptance operates as a promised future payment. A non-financial company 
is able to get a banks acceptance from the bank by pledging 30-50 % margin deposits and this 
acceptance later either sell or exchange in order to obtain cash  to a buyer but a buyer is to 
wait until matures. This process not only remains beyond the off-balance sheet, but also 
commercial banks are able to modify margin rate so as to fix the regulatory ratio. Because of 
two actions, undiscounted bank acceptance have substantially fluctuated (Jielu and Mu, 
2010). 
The microfinance companies have been main topic since 1998 for the Chinese 
government. The Chinese communist government had initiated a program and issued the 
guideline in order to boost the performance and curativeness of microfinance project so that 
the microfinance companies have been granted a legal status since 2008. On the other hand, 
the central government forbids accepting public deposits.In addition to this, the microfinance 
companies have been regarded as one of the most effective instrument in terms of poverty 
relieving factor and it is a good finance factor through meeting rural fiancé demand.However, 
the magnitude and spread of the microfinance companies has been converted into a factor 
impacting overall Chinese finance market (Rahman andLuo, 2012). 
The Contagion Effect Of The Boosted Shadow Banks  
Unlike to previous financial crisis, even the most advanced economies were vulnerable 
to the financial shock because ex-ante risk was not able to recognize due to high degree of 
leverage and outside regulation. The shadow banking system was regarded as stable hub but 
the network among financial actors in terms of off-balance sheet indeed was so big that the 
fragile of the system was totally disguised. The securitization process lead mortgage system to 
be liquid market and the instinct of profit rose among the financial actors. The shadow 
banking system created an intermediation a mechanism thatopens a huge profit area. Created 
intermediation without regulation and oversight induced systematic risks(Claessens et al, 
2010) 
Bordo and Wheelock(2007)  historically prove that prolonged low interest rate is a 
classical initiative factor in terms of boosting the bubble of asset price and is considered as 
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trigger financial crisis. When the argument is associated with the modern shadow market, the 
bubble of financial assets becomes more effective. Beginning with securitization process 
which real estate is converted in to liquid assets by, a low interest rate leads assets price and 
output to raise but eventually the process was reversed as tighten monetary policy causing low 
liquidity was conducted by The FED ( Calvo, 2009). The shadow banking was associated 
with the mortgage system prior to the financial crisis. Investment banks were integrated to the 
shadow banking system through repurchase agreements.For example,the hedge funds are 
important activities for investment banks in terms of higher return.However, the decrease in 
house price inducing the collapse of securitized mortgage system had contagion effect on 
highly leveraged investment banks, in turn, the mortgage system was subject to a 
deterioration which induced a increasing in haircuts and borrow against low-quality collateral 
became reverse,the shadow banking system associated with the mortgaged system collapsed 
and the global financial crisis raised from the dead (Pol, 2012).The collapse of Bear Stearns 
and the Lehman Brother is the most visible evidence in terms of cracked financial system.This 
argument show that the neglected financial risk through the shadow banking system caused a 
global financial crisis like an inevitable end (Gennaioli et al., 2013). 
Conclusion  
In this study, we aimed to identify the shadow banking system in China and their 
importance in the Chinese financial system. In order to implement reasonable policy, 
understanding of the properties of the shadow banking is quiet paramount. Because of the 
required, this study has beneficial effect on the literature. The subprime crisis has resulted in 
new discussion about Chinese activities because the shadow banking is one of the main 
factors to examine the crisis in addition to the risk taking in terms of the mortgage system. 
Indeed, the shadow banking is so similar to traditional banking system and financial 
intermediaries however the shadow banks do not expose to supervision and regulatory; thus, 
offering credit or loans by the shadow banks spread over the unsupervised financial areas. The 
shadow banking is so associated with the mortgage system; namely, they support each other. 
Generally, additional capital deployed by securitization was offered to the shadow banks and 
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these unauthorized loans lead the leverage dramatically raise; hence, the economy around 
world became so vulnerable because of financial fragility. 
In the study, the shadow banking systems have been tried to briefly examine and 
generate the features of the shadow banks. An important initial point to figuring out these 
systems is the Chinese state capitalism and its growth strategies. In China, a great number of 
loans are allocated to important industrial firms backed up by Chinese authorities so medium 
and small business is desperately needed of informal capital. As consequences of these 
properties, the shadow banks offered high costly loans to SME. Thus, the state capitalism in 
China caused the most financial notorious actors. In order to decrease financial risk all around 
work, the shadow banking system is key points so the regulatory and supervised are clearly an 
irreplaceable policy. Furthermore, the magnitude effect of the shadow banking on the 2008 
financial crisis and the undesirable effect on financial market may be future research topics. 
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